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Abstract
Purpose – This study contributes to the literature on hypocrisy in corporate social responsibility by
investigating how organizations adapt their nonfinancial disclosure after a social, environmental or
governance scandal.
Design/methodology/approach – The present research employs content analysis of nonfinancial
disclosures by 11 organizations during a 3-year timespan to investigate how they responded to major
scandals in terms of social, environmental and sustainability reporting and a content analysis of independent
counter accounts to detect the presence of views that contrast with the corporate disclosure and suggest
hypocritical behaviors.
Findings – Four patterns in the adaptation of reporting – genuine, allusive, evasive, indifferent – emerge from
information collected on scandals and socially responsible actions. The type of scandal and cultural factors can
influence the response to a scandal, as environmental and social scandal can attract more scrutiny than
financial scandals. Companies exposed to environmental and social scandals are more likely to disclose
information about the scandal and receive more coverage by external parties in the form of counter accounts.
Originality/value –Using a theoretical framework based on legitimacy theory and organizational hypocrisy,
the present research contributes to the investigation of the adaptation of reporting when a scandal occurs and
during its aftermath.
Keywords Nonfinancial disclosure, Corporate scandal, Content analysis, Corporate social responsibility,
Hypocrisy, Legitimacy theory
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In the past two decades, nonfinancial disclosure has become widespread with the increasing
popularity of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in both research and practice (Aguinis and
Glavas, 2012). However, an enduring wave of corporate scandals and disasters – including
the recent Facebook-Cambridge Analytica data privacy scandal at Facebook, the emissions
scandal and experiments on humans at Volkswagen, and the dramatic Boeing 737Max plane
crashes – has threatened the legitimacy of many corporations and other large organizations
(Lin-Hi and Muller, 2013; Zyglidopoulos, 2001).
Research on crisis communication has addressed reputational damage caused by a
scandal (Benoit, 1995, 1997), initially focusing on the communication – message, tone and
strategy – of the crisis manager and then shifting to a receiver orientation, examining
reactions of people interested in or affected by the crisis (Coombs and Holladay, 2014; Lauwo
et al., 2019; McDonald et al., 2010; Adams and Zutshi, 2014; Kuruppu and Milne, 2010).
According to Dean (2004), companies can lose their social legitimacy if they are perceived as
irresponsible, dishonest, breaking the law or acting in amanner that exhibits little concern for
society. When a “legitimacy gap” – the discrepancy between business behaviors and societal
expectations (Sethi, 1977) – is too wide, the organization’s survival is threatened. To limit
their loss of legitimacy, organizations must reestablish congruency between the values
implied by their actions and accepted societal norms through, among other actions,
developing an appropriate communication strategy (Cho et al., 2012; Lindblom, 2010).
Critical literature stresses that social, environmental and sustainability (SES) reports and
other nonfinancial disclosures may serve as veils that hide an organization’s intent to
strategically reconstruct its eroding legitimacy (Deegan, 2002). Indeed, parts of the social and
environmental accounting literature have addressed how nonfinancial reports hide
opportunistic strategies and the legitimizing efforts of managers among internal and
external stakeholders (Bebbington, 2001; Bellucci et al., 2019; Deegan, 2002; Dumay et al.,
2018; Milne and Patten, 2002). Conspicuous CSR communication is often associated either
with organizations attempting to defend their corporate legitimacy or companies that have
experienced a legitimacy issue (Bini et al., 2016; Morning and Schultz, 2006), under the
principle that “the more problematic the legitimacy, the greater the protestation of
legitimacy” (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990, p. 185).
Much of the literature acknowledges the importance of exploring the effects of various
factors on the perception of account appropriateness (Schmitt et al., 2004). Both impression
management theory (Neu et al., 1998) and account episodes theory (Sch€onbach, 1990) identify
five relevant components for making the communications strategies of scandal-ridden
companies appear sincere, convincing and effective: (1) admitting fault, (2) admitting damage,
(3) expressing remorse, (4) asking for forgiveness and (5) offering compensation.
Research suggests that the more companies expose their ethical and social ambitions, the
more likely they are to attract criticism from their stakeholders (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990;
Morning and Schultz, 2006;Winkler et al., 2019). In other words, if an organization focuses too
intently on communicating CSR virtues, some stakeholders may believe that the organization
is trying to hide something (Brown and Dacin, 1997).
The promotion of desirable qualities such as CSR tends to evoke even more skepticism
when a company already has a bad reputation or if it is in the midst of a significant scandal
(Morning and Schultz, 2006). This aspect is why we decided to study the features of
nonfinancial disclosure in eleven organizations that have weathered some of the largest
environmental, organizational and financial scandals of the past twenty years. This approach
allows us to investigate the topics of corporate hypocrisy and legitimacy. More specifically,
the present study contributes to the scientific debate on hypocrite in SES reporting by
empirically analyzing, through a diachronic approach, how organizations adapt their





perceptions in terms of legitimacy and hypocrisy related to different reporting behaviors are
experimentally tested. Such information is particularly interesting for legitimacy theorists for
two main reasons. First, as suggested by several authors, the literature lacks diachronic
studies after a corporate scandal, which represents an event in a company’s life that can
deeply undermine the credibility and the identity of such entities in the eyes of the
stakeholders (Bebbington et al., 2008; Blanc et al., 2019). Second, a scandal can provide an
evocative interpretation of the concepts of organizational hypocrisy and façade that can help
the organization in balancing divergent stakeholder claims, thus identifying new ways to
survive and plan a restart.
Our article is structured as follows. The next section presents our theoretical framework
based on organizational hypocrisy, legitimacy theory and Benoit’s (1995) classification of the
most recurrent behaviors adopted by companies involved in a scandal. Section 3 illustrates
the methodology of our diachronic content analysis of nonfinancial disclosures and counter
accounts. Section 4 presents our findings on the patterns of the evolution of nonfinancial
disclosure after a legitimacy-eroding event, also in light of a comparison with third-party
counter accounts. Section 5 summarizes and discusses the main contributions and
managerial implications of our study and provides ideas for further research.
The results of the present article have informed a second study that empirically tests the
perceptions of report users after a corporate scandal. This latter study focuses on the
concepts of remedial actions pursued by companies and admission of fault and is presented in
a separate companion paper in this issue.
2. Theoretical framework
Hypocrisy has been defined as a gap between assertions and actions (Shklar, 1984) and refers
to the “motivation to appear moral yet, if possible, avoid the cost of actually being moral”
(Batson et al., 2006, p. 321). Typically, hypocrisy is seen as undesirable and something to be
called out and eradicated (Delmas and Burbano, 2011), but some authors have explored its
inevitability (Brunsson, 2002) and even its desirability (Cho et al., 2015; Christensen et al.,
2013). In complex societies, corporations face diverse and often irreconcilable expectations,
and structured hypocrisy can help reconcile divergent interests from diverse stakeholder
groups. In this regard, Brunsson’s model of organized hypocrisy (1990, 1993, 2002, 2007) and
related studies (e.g. Christensen et al., 2013; Cho et al., 2015) define organized hypocrisy as an
attempt to explain the discrepancies between an organization’s image, planning and concrete
actions and how these discrepancies may offer organizations flexibility in managing
conflicting stakeholder expectations. Brunsson, in particular, goes beyond a model of a
unitary corporate façade, showing the ideas of reputation and organized hypocrisy that can
act as organizational and managerial purposes beyond societal legitimacy. Cho et al. (2015)
apply the concepts of organizational façade and organized hypocrisy to sustainability
reporting. These two notions, in fact, when taken together, raise the possibility that
incongruence between a corporation’s talk and its actions may generate beneficial
consequences for a broad set of organizational stakeholders. According to Brunsson
(2007), especially in the context of corporations, hypocrisy hides opportunities for change and
can help sustain the societal legitimacy of organizations. Christensen et al. (2013, p. 385)
affirm the following: “The tricky issue here, of course, is whether the motive behind hypocrisy is
to conceal an unpleasant truth or to reduce the difference between current and aspirational
reality.”
Moreover, Glozer and Morsing (2020, p. 365) assert that “conventional definitions of
corporate hypocrisy emphasize its basic criterion as a systematic decoupling between talk and
action.” In other words, hypocrisy is “the belief that a firm claims to be something that it is not”




However, the concept of hypocrisy must be read in the light of companies’ legitimacy
issues, which are crucial to their survival and success since the community and society at
large are seen as increasingly important stakeholders (Mitchell et al., 1997). As corporate
entities are influenced by and often influence the society in which they operate, societal aims
and perceptions can influence their policies. Thus, legitimacy can be viewed as a generalized
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate
within a socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions (Suchman,
1995). This definition implies that legitimacy is a desirable social good, that it is something
more than a matter of optics and that it may be defined and negotiated at various levels of
society (Mitchell et al., 1997). Organizations are thought to be legitimate when they pursue
socially acceptable goals in a socially acceptable manner.
As Buhr (1998) suggests, there are two dimensions at play in an organization’s efforts to
attain legitimacy: action (whether the organization’s activities are congruent with social
values) and presentation (whether the activities appear to be congruent with social values). Of
course, the actions of an organization may deviate extensively from societal norms, but
because the divergence goes unnoticed, the organization retains its legitimacy (Chen and
Roberts, 2010).
Legitimacy is also a dynamic concept, as expectations can change over time and particular
events might occur that adversely affect the reputation of a company, its legitimacy and
perhaps even its very existence (Makela and Nasi, 2010). Such change is often considered a
resource among supporters of legitimacy theory. On the one hand, organizations are
dependent on this resource for survival (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975); on the other hand,
organizations can manipulate how society perceives their behavior and activities: managers
will pursue strategies to ensure the continued supply of resources whenever the supply of
that particular resource is deemed vital to organizational survival (Deegan, 2002). Kuruppu
et al. (2019, p. 2081) have highlighted how legitimating actions relate to subtle, direct and
episodic interventions to placate specific salient stakeholders; for these authors, response
behavior is modulated by the need to gain, maintain or repair legitimacy, especially recurring
to intimate interactions with close stakeholders to preserve “good character” and secure the
company’s license to operate in a particular locality. As suggested by Bebbington et al. (2008),
this sporadic interaction is coherent with the fact that reputation risk management could
assist in understanding SES reporting practices and that stakeholder dialogue can be used as
a mere legitimating tool (Adams, 2004, p. 733).
The tension between sustainability discourse and practice has generated extensive and
in-depth studies on corporate voluntary sustainability reporting, often resulting in
contradictory conclusions (Milne and Gray, 2013; Unerman and Chapman, 2014). While
some authors support the potential of SES reporting to make corporations more accountable
and transparent about their social and environmental impacts (Bebbington et al., 2014;
Rodrıguez and LeMaster, 2007), part of the literature calls into question the validity of this
accounting practice because it tends to be limited in scope (O’Dwyer et al., 2005), disingenuous
(Aras and Crowther, 2009) and utilized as a legitimacy tool (Cho et al., 2012; Magness, 2006;
Milne and Gray, 2007) or for responding to institutional pressures (Thorne et al., 2014).
Supporters of legitimacy theory maintain that companies engage in SES reporting mainly to
secure their own interests (Milne and Gray, 2013) with the explicit aim of deflecting,
obfuscating or rationalizing their relatively poor social and environmental performance
under reputational threats (Cho et al., 2010, 2015), rather than indicating rational plans and
actions for facing real sustainability problems (Boiral, 2013; Cho et al., 2010; Patten, 2012).
Given the above, we can affirm that legitimacy theory has contributed to accounting
theory in several ways over the past forty years, especially in the field of SES accounting and
reporting. For example, legitimacy theory is often used to motivate CSR and voluntary





their external costs or diminish pressures that are being imposed by external stakeholders or
regulators (Adams, 2002; Tate et al., 2010). This behavior occurs because organizations use
these reports to influence (or even manipulate) stakeholder perceptions of their image,
performance and impact (Coupland, 2006; Deegan, 2002; Guidry and Patten, 2010). This
assertion seems to question the validity of legitimacy theory in stimulating the production of
reliable and useful SES reports. Scholars who support this theoretical perspective claim that
legitimacy problems can emerge (Deegan, 2002; Patten, 1992) when there is a disparity
between community values and the organization’s values and impacts. The loss of consensus
can be extremely dangerous for companies, especially in terms of successful customer
acquisition and long-term retention; thus, by using external accountability mechanisms,
sustainability disclosure can strengthen an organization’s social legitimacy and improve its
image and perception among external stakeholders and the local community, which is
sometimes referred to as green washing (Clarkson et al., 2011).
The manipulation of an organization’s image is perceived as being easier to accomplish
than improving sustainability performance, supply chain structure or value system (Dowling
and Pfeffer, 1975; Szabo and Webster, 2020). A conscious or unconscious manipulation
approach is fairly common among firms (especially the biggest ones) that have negative
social or environmental impacts, even referring to dialogic tools of communication such as
social media (Lee et al., 2018; Manetti and Bellucci, 2016). For these reasons, legitimacy theory
applied to SES reporting is intertwined with stakeholder skepticism within the CSR domain,
increasing the idea of corporate hypocrisy, especially by consumers and local communities
(e.g. Torelli et al., 2012; Wagner et al., 2009). SES reporting can be used as a means of
demonstrating that the organization has realigned its practices, policies and performance
with the expectations of organizational audiences. The analysis focuses on the strategies
used in corporate narrative documents to restore legitimacy after a corporate scandal,
environmental disaster or product failure.
Following previous studies (Bebbington et al., 2008; Lauwo et al., 2019), in this paper, we
build on the framework developed by Benoit (1995, 1997) to identify the most recurrent
behaviors adopted by companies that have been involved in a scandal. Benoit (1995) sustains
that, in an attempt to mitigate the effects of the scandal, companies might explain the actions
that have been put into place but might also be evasive and focus on other aspects of their
operations that reflect positively on corporate behavior. These diverse behaviors present
interesting relationships with the concept of hypocrisy, understood as the discrepancy
between claims and the actions pursued and with the concept of legitimacy as forms of social
accreditation.
More specifically, Benoit (1995) suggests that a company can deny or be silent about the
triggering event or disclose information about what has happened. From these
implications, Benoit derives an interest in the scope and extent of voluntary disclosure
on salient information regarding a corporate scandal: the choice to disclose or not disclose
information about what happened can depend on several circumstances. If a company is
not exposed to the scrutiny of a wide range of stakeholders, the decision to avoid disclosure
can serve the purpose of avoiding attracting unwanted scrutiny (O’Donovan, 2002;
Kuruppu et al., 2019). If a company is exposed to intense scrutiny, stakeholders will expect
it to be accountable and admit its fault for what occurred; in this latter case, external
reporting serves the purpose of achieving moral legitimacy (Kuruppu et al., 2019), thereby
legitimizing the company’s actions in the eyes of stakeholders on the basis of societal moral
norms (Suchman, 1995).
The present study can advance the current literature on this topic by examining the
instrumental use of corporate reporting by empirically analyzing how organizations adapt







We explored the instrumental use of corporate reporting by empirically analyzing how
organizations adapt their SES reports after a scandal. For this purpose, we used content
analysis of company reports (Bryman and Bell, 2015). The same methodology was applied to
the investigation of counter accounts produced by independent parties (Brown et al., 2015;
Gallhofer et al., 2015) in the same periods.
Content analysis is a research technique that objectively and systematically identifies
specific characteristics of certain types of information (Holsti, 1969). It offers a flexible
approach to the examination of various media, documents and texts while also quantifying
content according to predetermined categories in a systematic and replicable manner
(Bryman and Bell, 2015). It has long been used in corporate disclosure studies (Guthrie et al.,
2004; Manetti and Bellucci, 2016), because it encourages repeatability and valid inferences
from data (Krippendorff, 2004). Content analysis can be used to better understand the
meanings, intentions, consequences and context of communication (Cavanagh, 1997) and
identify critical processes (Lederman, 1991).
We used the results of the content analysis (i.e. the two major dimensions that
distinguish nonfinancial disclosure) as a point of departure to further explore
stakeholders’ perceptions (i.e. legitimacy and hypocrisy) in the companion paper to this
article. Taken together, the two studies offer a more complete picture of the phenomenon
under study and produce robust findings (Davis et al., 2011). Indeed, by collecting and
combining the strengths of both qualitative and quantitative data, we provide a better
answer to the research questions (Hoque et al., 2017). Although the weights assigned to the
quantitative and qualitative components are equivalent, the qualitative study precedes the
quantitative one.
We explored the main components that characterize the nonfinancial disclosure of
companies involved in a scandal. Specifically, we observed how companies report and
disclose their commitment to sustainability during a crisis and how corporate reporting
practices changed following the scandal. Doing so enabled us to identify different clusters of
organizational behaviors and themajor dimensions that differentiate nonfinancial disclosure.
Based on the evidence of this paper, in the companion study, we explored potential users’
reactions to different nonfinancial disclosures.
Building on the purposive sampling design used in Romenti et al. (2014), we decided to use
multiple cases as a means of assessing whether nonfinancial disclosure is used by
organizations facing a financial, organizational or environmental crisis in order to regain
legitimacy. We deliberately selected eleven cases – British Petroleum (BP), Deutsche Bank,
Deutsche Post, FIFA, JP Morgan, Livestrong Foundation, Monsanto, Samarco, Tesco,
Toshiba and Volkswagen – that fulfilled the following criteria:
(1) The organizations issued a nonfinancial disclosure or an integrated report during,
one year before and one year after the crisis;
(2) The sample exemplifies different crisis types and levels of responsibility;
(3) The crisis drew international media attention;
(4) The crisis resulted in significant compensation and/or reparations (e.g. class action
lawsuits);
(5) The events happened after 2006, the year of publication of the widely adopted Global
Reporting Initiative G3 reporting guidelines.





Using categories provided by Coombs (2007), our study focuses on several different types of
crises, including natural disasters, organizational misdeeds, management misconduct,
corruption, human-error accidents and technical-error accidents. Stressing different
organizations and crisis types allows us to explore how companies decided to address
challenges to their legitimacy while also commenting on responsibility levels and the nature
of these crises.
We collected information that could help us understand how companies report and
disclose their commitment to sustainability during a crisis. We focused on SES reports from
the year before the scandal as a baseline and proceeded to analyze reports in the next two
years in order to understand the evolution of disclosure following a crisis. If an SES report
was not available in a specific year, we selected the most similar piece of nonfinancial
disclosure or the complete annual report.
To investigate how corporate reporting practices changed following the scandal, we
developed an analytic framework based on a preliminary study of the scholarly literature
(Hildebrand et al., 2017; Schultz et al., 2011) and the results of a pilot study where three expert
researchers independently ran a content analysis on the SES reports of BP for the years 2009,
2010, 2011 and 2012 using a preliminary set of categories. The results of this pilot study were
discussed, and a final set of categories was then defined. The categories used in our main
content analysis are shown in Table 2. We collected data about the general features of the
report, the basic features of the scandal and how it was managed, relevant stakeholders and
the communication strategies that were adopted in its wake.
Prior research emphasizes that corporate communication usually offers a partial
representation of the facts described, mainly based on management perceptions (Adams,
2004; Milne et al., 2009). A solution to this issue is represented by the use of alternative
representations of the facts produced by other parties, which can be affected by a company’s
activities. These sources of information have the capability of complementing official
disclosures by problematizing and challenging the facts presented by a company in its
official statements (Adams, 2004; Dey et al., 2011; Ruffing, 2007; Tregidga et al., 2012), thereby
giving voice to a greater range of interested parties (Brown et al., 2015; Gallhofer et al., 2015).
Organization
Year of
scandal Scandal Type of crisis Sector
Country of the
organization
BP 2010 Oil disaster Environmental Oil and Gas England
Deutsche Bank 2013 Corruption Financial Bank Germany
Deutsche Post 2008 Tax evasion Financial Post Germany
FIFA 2015 Corruption Socio-
organizational
Sport Switzerland




































The main source of alternative representation is counter accounting (Gallhofer et al., 2006).
This term is used to refer to documents on a company’s activity produced by different kinds
of external parties and usually spread on the web, which represents a freely accessible space
that stakeholders are increasingly using to collect information on a company (Gallhofer et al.,
2006). Stakeholders that issue counter accounts can recognize and confirm a company’s
engagement with CSR and offer additional information about its activities. Additional
information provided through counter accounts can either be supportive of a company’s
claims or express contrasting views (Hooghiemstra, 2000; Joutsenvirta, 2011; Laine and
Vinnari, 2017).
For these reasons, we integrated the content analysis of SES reports through an analysis
of counter accounts, allowing us to reconstruct a more complete picture of companies’ CSR
activities.
Some studies use counter accounts to assess the presence of contrasting views expressed
by some groups of stakeholders (e.g. Laine and Vinnari, 2017). To the aim of this study, we
consider information on CSR issued from independent sources to better understand a
company’s activities in relation to a crisis.
While some empirical studies on counter accounting focus on documents produced by
specialized NGOs (e.g. Denedo et al., 2017), others consider news articles produced by any
external group (Boiral, 2013). In this study, we adopt the same definition as Boiral (2013).
News articles included in the studymust address one of the scandals under investigation and
its consequences and must be based on specific documented facts (Boiral, 2013). Our main
information source was the EBSCO Business Source Premier databank. Overall, we found
107 reports with the abovementioned characteristics. The reports were carefully read by two
expert researchers. This allowed us to analyze documents produced by different stakeholder
groups associated with the companies in our study.
3.2 Hypocrisy in corporate reports
We focused on SES reports and categorized the different behaviors of the organizations in
our sample concerning the disclosure of nonfinancial information after an environmental,
Categories Description
General info Title, typology and year of publication of the report
Reference to the scandal Presence of any reference to or descriptions of the scandal in
the report
Reference in the summary Whether there is a reference to the scandal in the general
summary of the report
Quantification of the damage Disclosure about the costs associated with the consequence of
a scandal
CSR remedy Presence of descriptions of actions aimed at finding solutions
for the crisis and an assessment of whether these solutions
were coherent
Images of the scandal Preston et al. (1996),
Busco and Quattrone (2015)
Presence and assessment of any images related to the scandal
Channel of stakeholder engagement Description of active channels of stakeholder engagement
Engaged stakeholders Description of the categories of engaged stakeholders
Degree of stakeholder engagement Level of stakeholder engagement
Stakeholder comments Disclosure of comments made by involved stakeholders
Communications strategy Schultz et al.
(2011)
Type of communication strategy
Admission of fault Linsley and Kajuter
(2008), Schultz et al. (2011)








socio-organizational or financial scandal. As declared in our theoretical framework, we build
on the framework developed by Benoit (1995, 1997) to identify the most recurrent behaviors
adopted by companies that have been involved in a scandal. The first issue thatwe consider is
whether a company decides to disclose information about a scandal. According to Benoit
(1995, 1997), a firmmight decide to remain silent about a critical event to not attract unwanted
scrutiny. In the presence of a scandal, this decision is also influenced by the salience of the
event and, ultimately, by the type and magnitude of the scandal. We label this dimension the
scope of disclosure on the scandal.
As highlighted in Section 2, SES reporting plays a crucial role during organizational crises
or public controversies as a means of resolving the conflict by shaping audiences’ attitudes
toward the issue of contention. The literature suggests that the use of rhetoric and argument
is particularly frequent during public controversies, conflicts over values or shortfalls in
corporate social and environmental performance (Brennan and Merkl-Davies, 2014;
Coupland, 2006) since organizations depend on public approval and need to build public trust.
As all companies under investigation have been involved in significant scandals, which
have seriously harmed the organizations themselves and the environments they operate in,
we consider a company that decides to disclose information according to the response
strategies identified by Benoit as an “evasion of responsibility” and as “reducing the
offensiveness of an event” as potentially hypocritical. Evading responsibility involves
attributing fault to circumstances or accidents, while a reduction of offensiveness takes place
by providing information about other aspects that are positive or by minimizing the
magnitude of the event. An evasion of responsibility and attempts to reduce the offensiveness
of an event might reveal potential hypocritical behaviors. Hence, disclosure itself cannot offer
a coherent account of how a company has managed a crisis.
To better understand the coherence between information disclosed and actions effectively
taken, we have collected information on the disclosure of remedial actions. Benoit (1997)
refers to the communication of this kind of information as the disclosure of “corrective
actions.” The disclosure of corrective actions is considered fundamental to achieving moral
legitimacy when a scandal occurs (Kuruppu et al., 2019). Hence, the second aspect relates to
the extent to which a company offers information on the actions taken after a scandal. We
label this dimension as the scope of the disclosure of remedial actions.
The dimensions analyzed allowed us to build a Cartesian system for companies’
classification (Figure 1), where the scope of the disclosure of scandals and related factors is on
the x-axis and the scope of the disclosure of remedial actions is on the y-axis. The following
elements in the reports contributed to the categorization: (1) extensive accounts of the scandal
in themain text of the report; (2) reference to the scandal in the general summary of the report;
(3) disclosure about the costs associated with the consequences of the scandal;
(4) explanations of coherent actions aimed at finding remedial solutions for the crisis or
providing relief to the affected stakeholders; and (5) images directly related to the scandal;
(6) clear admission of fault or responsibility.
This classification permits the identification of potential hypocritical behaviors based on
our theoretical framework. Companies positioned in the second quadrant (no disclosure about
the scandal, but description of remedial actions) and in the fourth quadrant (disclosure of the
scandal, but no illustration of actions or strategies that allow to restore a company’s image)
can be labeled as potential hypocrites. In fact, a difference between claims and actions would
emerge in the former case (a company that speaks about remedial actions but does not admit
fault and does not refer to the scandal), while in the latter case, a company might want to
appear moral by disclosing information about the scandal but not bearing the costs related to
the remedial actions needed (Batson et al., 2006), reflecting a decoupling between talk and
action (Glozer and Morsing, 2020; Wagner et al., 2009). However, companies in the first




considered hypocritical if the actions depicted are not coherently implemented (Brunsson,
1989). In light of this, an investigation of counter accounts can support the detection of
potential hypocrisy for organizations positioned in the first quadrant.
4. Results: different patterns in nonfinancial disclosure after a scandal
Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the categorization that emerged from the
content analysis, including the different clusters of organizational behaviors, and the
diachronic effects between the first and second years of reporting after the scandal for certain
organizations.
Four clusters of company behavior concerning nonfinancial disclosure after a potentially
legitimacy-eroding scandal emerge. The following sections depict the characteristics of
reporting for companies in each cluster.
4.1 “Genuine” reporting practices
The first cluster encompasses those organizations that, after a scandal, provided full
disclosure of the events, an admission of fault and an illustration of the remedies taken, often
with associated quantitative data and costs, such as BP does in its 2010 report:
The tragic accident in the Gulf ofMexico on 20April 2010 cost 11 lives, leading to amajor oil spill and
a widespread loss of trust in BP. We are so very sorry for what happened. (. . .) Our task now is to
earn back the trust that was lost and build a sustainable BP for the future. This report explains the
measures we are taking to strengthen safety, restore trust and build shareholder value responsibly
for the long term.
A letter from our group chief executive, BP Sustainability report 2010, p. 2
Figure 1.
Disclosure strategy







The report also illustrates the efforts made to take remedies:
Within hours of the Deepwater Horizon accident, BP teams were working to stop the leak. We also
acted to minimize the spill’s impact on the environment by containing, removing and dispersing oil
offshore, protecting the shoreline and cleaning up oil that came ashore. And we worked with wildlife
groups to develop rescue and rehabilitation programmes for turtles, birds and other species.
BP Sustainability report 2010
We label the group of organizations featuring this modality of nonfinancial disclosure,
represented in the outer part of the first quadrant of the Cartesian systemdepicted in Figure 1,
as the “genuine” cluster. Organizations in this cluster appeared to provide full and
transparent disclosure of the negative events, andmany of their resulting CSR practices were
coherent with the issues at the center of the scandal. The following excerpt illustrates the
expression of regret and the willingness to put remedial actions in place by Volkswagen:
When it comes to the diesel crisis, we have failed to live up to our own standards in several areas. The
irregularities in the handling of emissions tests contradict everything that we stand for. We regret
this immensely and are aware thatwe have let our stakeholders down.We (. . .) are fully committed to
re-embracing our standards and winning back public trust.
Our approach, Volkswagen 2016 Sustainability report, p. 7
Among the companies that were protagonists of financial scandals, Toshiba, one of themajor
Japanese-based multinationals, was the only one that reported on the incident and the
remedies put in place. Their report dedicated many paragraphs to the matter and provided a
detailed public apology. This could reflect a cultural, country-based influence.
The 2015 and 2016 reports from Samarco, 2015 and 2016 reports from Toshiba, 2015 and
2016 reports from Volkswagen and a 2010 report from BP provided all of these details. At
least to an investigation that does not include external points of view, these reports did not
attempt to hide any sensible information about the scandal or the company’s responsibilities.
The content analysis of independently issued news articles revealed that, in most cases,
counter accounts explicitly supported companies’ actions and integrated the set of
information that can be found in SES reports. Starting from the “genuine” cluster, we
observe that counter accounts seemed to confirm the actions that Volkswagen, Toshiba and
Samarco adopted as remedies. An example is provided as follows (Toshiba):
The electronics to nuclear power conglomerate has since appointed more outside directors and has
set about restructuring its business, including selling off unprofitable divisions.
Why Toshiba Is Getting Hit With A Record Fine, Fortune
Some misalignments between what the companies declared and the actions they undertook
emerged from the analysis of counter accounts regarding BP. In fact, some documents
supported the view that BP behaved hypocritically. Soon before the scandal, the company
claimed to be the greenest oil and gas company (Mark Ritson, “Rebranding cannot plug
credibility gap,”May 2010). Moreover, the BP 2009 sustainability report noted that safety and
employee training represented key aspects of BP’s operating style. Some articles criticized BP
because the disaster could have been avoided. One report reads as follows:
On Tuesday, the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling,
established by President Barack Obama last May, released its final report. The commission
concluded that the blowout, which eventually caused more than 4 million barrels of oil to flow into
the Gulf of Mexico, was preventable and the result of a “systemic” industry-wide failure to put
safety first.




Another issue reported that BP employees had not been properly trained. As a consequence,
they were not able to detect the signals of the inadequacy of the cement that was used:
While unable to explain the pressure in the drill line, the well site leaders feel that the kill line results
demonstrate the integrity of the bottom cement, and they declare the test a success. In fact, the test
was no such thing, and the flow and pressure readings should have indicated to the crew that the
cement was inadequate and that hydrocarbons were leaking into the well. Just a few hours later,
emergency measures fail and hydrocarbons rising from the well ignite on the rig.
Tara Hoke, “Fostering a Culture of Safety,” Civil Engineering, January 2013, p. 38
Other counter accounts claimed that BPwas not doing asmuch as it could to remedy the crisis
(“LEADER: Toxic BP must stop spreading its poison,” Marketing Week, Vol. 33, Issue 25,
June 2010). However, these counter accounts do not directly challenge remedial actions put in
place by BP after the scandal but, rather, document inappropriate behaviors that previously
occurred. The only exception is a document that claims that the company had paid United
States but not Mexican fishermen for the damage (Veronica Calderon, “Mexican fishermen
file US lawsuit against BP for Gulf oil spill damages).
As is subsequently shown in this section, BP is the only company that changed quadrants
over the years, moving from “genuine” in 2010 (the year of the scandal) to “evasive” in 2011.
The presence of different sources that criticized BP’s behavior and the scarcity of information
about the scandal in the year after the oil spill may signal the presence of a potential
misalignment of claims and actions. Overall, the counter accounts seemed to confirm the
efforts made by “genuine” companies to restore their legitimacy. Thus, companies in the
“genuine” cluster do not show signs of hypocritical behavior.
4.2 The “indifferent” cluster
The opposite side of the Cartesian system, in the outer part of the third quadrant, includes
organizations in the “indifferent” cluster. The reports of these organizations did not provide
any coverage of the events of the scandal. Tesco (2014 and 2015 reports), Livestrong (2012),
Monsanto (2011 and 2012) and Deutsche Post (2008 and 2009) opted not to include any
disclosures about the scandal in their nonfinancial reports, trying not to create any link
between them and the events that generated the scandal. In providing no disclosure, they
consequently provided no information about the remedies taken, if any. In other words,
stakeholders and users of these reports could not learn anything about the crisis by reading
these reports. Livestrong was named the Lance Armstrong Foundation until 2011, when the
doping scandal that toppled its funder was reported. However, this name change was not
mentioned or explained in the 2012 report, suggesting a kind of organizational façade aimed
at managing stakeholders’ expectations. Neither Tesco, Deutsche Post nor Monsanto
described their scandals or provided information on the events. Tesco provided even fewer
details on stakeholder engagement practices in its 2014 reports than in the baseline report
before the scandal; this was also the case for Volkswagen and could suggest a strategy to
deflect criticism. In reports issued by Monsanto after its crisis, there was no mention of the
scandal, although a list of measures adopted in subsequent years was included, especially
concerning the improvement of internal controls.
4.3 “Allusive” cluster and its relationship with “evasive”
In the same third quadrant, but in the inner part, are organizations included in what we call
the “allusive” cluster. JP Morgan (2013 and 2014 reports) and Livestrong (2013) merely
alluded to some events that could be linked to the crisis or the scandal, or they hinted at the
scandal using “difficult months,” “tough periods” and similar expressions. No full disclosure





activities were coherent with the origin of the scandal. These reports did not comment on the
specific issue or provide particular details. JP Morgan made no clear reference to the incident,
while it highlighted the measures adopted to strengthen internal controls, the founding
principles that inspired the company and the initiatives to support local communities and a
sustainable economy.
Then, the third quadrant is characterized by the presence of two kinds of companies:
“indifferent” (Tesco, Monsanto and Deutsche Post) and “allusive” (JP Morgan). Livestrong
moved from “indifferent” during the year of the scandal to “allusive” during the following
year. We could not find any independent report for Monsanto or Deutsche Post. Only one
report was available for Tesco. The article reported on the company’s decision to hire external
auditors and lawyers to shed light on profit misreporting. A few independent reports
addressed the Livestrong and JP Morgan scandals. For Livestrong, counter accounts
discussed howmany companies had decided to stop sponsoring the foundation. Some articles
claimed that, despite the scandal, the foundation was supporting important projects. For JP
Morgan, the only issue discussed was the settlement that the company had to pay for. The
presence of only a few counter accounts might reveal that those companies are less covered
by the media and, hence, might not have been under scrutiny as were other companies
analyzed, which could be the reason for nondisclosure: companies thatmight avoid attracting
unwanted scrutiny by not providing information about the scandal through external
reporting. Crucial factors that can explain this circumstance are type of scandal and
dimension. Tesco, Monsanto, Deutsche Post and JP Morgan have been involved in financial
scandals, which might be less salient than social or environmental scandals.
Financial scandals might also affect fewer stakeholder categories, whereas a social and
environmental scandal can impact local communities and attract the attention of several
NGOs and other associations. Regarding size, the only company included in this quadrant
that has not been involved in a financial scandal is Livestrong. Livestrong is not a for-profit
organization and is considerably smaller than the other companies in the same quadrant.
Hence, the Livestrong scandal might have directly affected a restricted number of
stakeholders.
4.4 “Evasive” companies
Finally, the fourth type of behavior pertains to organizations in the “evasive” cluster,
positioned in the inner part of the second quadrant. As previously illustrated, companies in
this quadrant can be considered to be hypocritical, as there is a gap between claims and
actions. These reports – Deutsche Bank (2013, 2014), FIFA (2015, 2016) and BP (2011) – did
not always provide full disclosure of the scandal or the crisis, but they did provide a limited
set of information. The disclosure was focused on the remedies taken to strengthen some
regulations, to avoid future issues or to signal a commitment into a specific direction.
On 26 February 2016, Zurich hosted an extraordinary FIFA Congress that kick-started a
transformational and much-needed governance overhaul after the most challenging times in the
history of the institution. (. . .) With new management in place and a strong legal framework to
cement the principles of good governance in the organisation, in 2016 FIFA took a first and crucial
step toward getting back on track.
2016: A year to refocus FIFA, FIFA Governance Report 2016, p. 11.
In other words, it appears theywerewilling to redirect the attention of stakeholders and users
from the scandal directly to the remedies undertaken to avoid similar issues in the future, in a
strategy to limit the consequences in terms of the erosion of their legitimacy. The companies
in this cluster shared some common elements in their reporting practices, including weak and




company was founded, and extensive documentation on antifraud, anticorruption and risk
mitigation measures adopted in the years following the scandal.
Independent reports on FIFA andDeutsche Bankmainly talked aboutwhat happened and
the consequences of the scandals. No counter accounts directly contested the remedy plans of
these organizations. This result may be related to the types of scandals – these two cases are
the only cases of corruption included in our study. The behavior of companies in this
quadrant can be considered an attempt to shape stakeholders’ perceptions by disclosing only
positive information (O’Donovan, 2002).
4.5 Clusters and different types of scandals
Organizations that suffered an environmental scandal tend to be located in the upper right-
hand part of the Cartesian system, in the “genuine” cluster. These organizations usually
provided more comprehensive disclosure than organizations that suffered a different type of
crisis or scandal. This may be because environmental scandals usually have a larger impact
on media – think of the explosion on the Deepwater Horizon oil platform, the consequent
“black sea” of oil and all the pictures of endangered wildlife. It would be impossible, if not
counterproductive in terms of the legitimacy gap (Lindblom, 2010; Sethi, 1977), to ignore or
hide such events in corporate reports. In addition to being a reporting principle, transparency
represents a superior communication strategy in these cases.
The diachronic perspective provided many insights into how the organizations of our
cases showed different behaviors across a two-year timespan after the scandal (Tilling and
Tilt, 2010). BP represents an interesting case: its 2010 report, the first one after the crisis in the
Gulf of Mexico, included “negative” images of, for example, the burning Deepwater Horizon
platform or the large part of the ocean covered in black oil. However, in the following year’s
report in 2011, such images disappear, and only “positive” ones, such as pictures of brand-
new oil platforms or clean ecosystems, are found.
The dynamic analysis of stakeholder engagement practices is also significant. The
stakeholder engagement activities reported by BP expanded in the year after the crisis but
then returned to normal levels that following year. This hints at the company’s desire to
signal a commitment to the needs of stakeholders and their requests, especially in times of
turmoil. Likewise, in 2015, FIFA provided a fair, if not full, depiction of the events behind its
corruption scandal, although it did not fully admit to any direct responsibility. This lengthy
description did not appear again in the 2016 report, which reflects behavior similar to the use
of images in BP reports. Another interesting example of minimization is Livestrong, formerly
the Lance Armstrong Foundation: after quietly changing its name in 2012, it was not until
2013 that the foundation stated that it was “able to weather a tough period and move to the
next phase of [its] evolution” (Letter from the President, Livestrong Foundation 2013 Annual
report, p. 2).
5. Discussion and conclusions
Following previous studies (Bebbington et al., 2008; Lauwo et al., 2019), in this study, we
adopted the framework developed by Benoit (1995, 1997) to identify the most recurrent
behaviors adopted by companies that have been involved in a scandal. More specifically, we
attempted to understand the actions implemented by companies when responding to a
scandal.
Supported by a theoretical framework based on legitimacy theory and organizational
hypocrisy, we investigated 11 companies that were involved in major scandals to assess
changes in sustainability reports after a crisis occurred. Because SES reports might not be





accounts – reports issued by independent third parties –were used to complement SES report
analysis. Informed by the qualitative insights of this research, we also developed a
companion paper to this article in which we conducted an experiment to understand how
stakeholders perceive companies’ actions aimed at creating legitimacy and restoring their
images. Together, these two papers have value for investigating the adaptation of SES
reporting from the integrated perspective of both organizations and their stakeholders,
contributing to the accounting and management literature by answering the call for more
research on how a message from a company is perceived (Tregidga et al., 2012).
The present research provides several contributions to the current literature on these
topics. First, this study contributes to the literature on how companies react to corporate
scandals and how their reporting practices change after such episodes occur. The focus of
analysis is on nonfinancial disclosure strategies used to restore legitimacy after a corporate
scandal, when accounting and nonfinancial disclosures aremobilized to conceal the threats of
stigma, manage the legitimacy gap (Sethi, 1977) and repair spoiled identity (Lauwo et al.,
2019). Our findings show that companies respond to corporate scandals in very different
ways. While some companies (the “genuine”) implement remedial actions and disclose
extensive information about the scandal, others (the “evasive”) put some remedial actions in
place but do not communicate detailed information about the issues they faced. Some of the
examined companies (the “indifferent” and, to some extent, the “allusive”) did not implement
any remedial actions or disclose information about the scandal. Our analysis of the
“indifferent” cluster provides new empirical evidence to the strand of research initiated by
Menon et al. (1999) and Griffin et al. (1991) on the “no comments” kind of disclosure after a
crisis (Benoit, 1995; Kuruppu et al., 2019).
Second, we extend the framework developed by Benoit (1995, 1997) to investigate
organizational responses to a significant scandal. While the original framework has been
designed to address responses occurring during a crisis, which can also be based on
groundless accusations, we explore cases where companies are effectively responsible for a
scandal that has received scant attention. Moreover, while Benoit (1995, 1997) illustrates
potential disclosure strategies that can be adopted during a crisis, we build on this framework
and on the emerging evidence fromSES reports issued by companies to define amore detailed
framework that can be used to investigate nonfinancial disclosures occurring after a major
scandal has occurred.
Third, our results show that the type of scandal and, to some extent, cultural factors can
affect how a company manages an incident. From a legitimacy theory perspective, our
empirical results can contribute to the developing literature on SES reporting as a means of
demonstrating a realignment of organizational practices, policies and performance with the
expectations of stakeholders. Our findings show that CSR represents a double-edged sword
with respect to legitimacy-threatening episode management: the four patterns highlighted in
our study show different ways to deal with stakeholders and the associated risk of
hypocritical behavior after a scandal. Different reactions can be linked not only to the
different scandals but also to the characteristics of the groups of stakeholders that the
company has to deal with. Given the sector of activity and the extent of the scandal, BP,
Samarco and Volkswagen (“genuine” cluster) may have received greater pressure from their
stakeholders. Not surprisingly, we have found a significant number of counter accounts
precisely for these companies. Then, arguably, to respond to the pressure, those firms reacted
by offering broader disclosures. However, if the stakeholder groups are limited or not
pressing, the company can choose not to use reporting to discuss what happened because
doing so would attract much more attention than that attention that the scandal attracted
(Kuruppu et al., 2019). This strategy acknowledges the erosion of legitimacy as a socially
constructed process, in which being portrayed by prominent actors as deviating from the




our study, we also contribute to the calls by Scott and Walsham (2005) and Bebbington et al.
(2008), who claim that conducting a longitudinal examination of companies’ reports would be
instructive to understand how they respond to a scandal.
Fourth, we contribute to understanding of third parties’ insights into the instrumental use
of corporate reporting. News media, social movements and NGOs perform an important
function of monitoring and challenging organizational behavior. It is interesting to note that
there were no dissenting counter accounts for companies that provided full disclosure of a
scandal and performed coherent CSR activities. This suggests that this pattern of behavior is
less vulnerable to claims of corporate hypocrisy, especially for environmental scandals,
which have a large impact on media and public opinion. The counter account analysis
revealed that only in a few cases did independent parties offer contrasting views of a
company’s actions and claims. This suggests that reducing the scope of the disclosure is not
the best tactic if an organization wants to avoid green-washing claims and to preserve its
legitimacy among third parties. It appears that monitor organizations and independent third
parties appreciate the willingness to offer full disclosure without omitting negative
performance.
The present research also inspires a set of practical recommendations.We believe that our
research reveals some significant practical and managerial implications on how managers
should handle a reputational loss, regain trust and avoid perceptions of hypocrisy. Our
findings demonstrate that fully disclosing a scandal, its consequences and the related
remedial actions lead to recognition from independent parties. As the counter accounts
analysis shows, in most cases, coherency and transparency are confirmed and supported by
independent third parties. Thus, companies that make full disclosure of the scandal by
admitting their fault and illustrating remedial actions are likely not perceived as hypocritical.
Therefore, managers should provide a description of the scandals and the factors that
contributed to determining it. Details about the actions undertaken to face the scandal should
be illustrated as well. Our findings suggest to managers that stakeholders can appreciate
disclosure that highlights failures or mistakes, especially for voluntary disclosures. In
addition, the disclosure of negative information is coherent with sustainable reporting
standards, such as GRI, which demand that companies disclose positive and negative
information to provide an unbiased disclosure of their performance (Jahn and Br€uhl, 2019).
The present research also has some limitations that could be overcome in future research.
First, with regard to the research design, the content analysis was limited to SES reports in
the years before, during, and after the scandal. Further studies could broaden the sample of
organizations and the parameters of the content and could include other forms of dialogic
communication, which is an increasingly recognized vector of stakeholder engagement.
Academic studies are paying attention to less conventional forms of communication
surrounding a scandal, such as press releases or social media marketing campaigns, which
could be examined. A company’s disclosure on digital platforms is particularly relevant, as
these technological instruments have significantly influenced how we keep track of events.
This fact makes disclosure on digital platforms extremely impactful because their content is
easily accessible to many individuals and can last for years. Stakeholders who engage in
digital dialogues with a company can contribute to the coconstruction of the corporate image
that emerges before, during and after a scandal. This process of cocreation can amplify the
effects of hypocrisy perceptions, strengthening the hypocritical image and compromised
legitimacy of a company. Indeed, this helps create a negative collective memory – a socially
generated common perception of an event – that survivesmany years after a scandal (Garcıa-
Gavilanes et al., 2017). We, therefore, pose the following questions for further research:
How do companies adapt the digital disclosure of nonfinancial information after a scandal?
How does this process evolve on digital platforms? Is digital dialogue with stakeholders





clusters that we have identified be adapted to the digital context? Similarly, press releases can
be used as an effective means to convey CSR information (Guthey and Morsing, 2014),
even when the need to consider different stakeholder informative needs generates ambiguity
in messaging (Eisenberg, 1984). How can companies use press releases to adapt their social
and environmental communication and preserve their legitimacy after negative media
coverage?
Second, in our study, we provide a framework that depicts companies’ different
disclosures after a scandal. However, to implement one of the four behaviors concerning
nonfinancial disclosure, companies can adopt different communication strategies that may
reinforce or reduce organizational legitimacy and hypocrisy perceptions. For instance,
genuine companies can decide to implement informative communication (informing
stakeholders about the crisis and the companies’ actions) or a more responsive strategy
(where the companies demonstrate to stakeholders how they integrate their suggestions and
concerns into the company’s activities). Companies could also implement an involving
strategy by asking stakeholders to work together to address the issue and limit the damage
(Morsing and Schultz, 2006). As hypocrisy involves a willingness to appear moral while
avoiding the cost of actually being moral, a mere informative strategy should be perceived as
more hypocritical than the other strategies. However, as it is also represented by a gap
between assertions and actions, the adoption of responsive communication should entirely
correspond to the implementation of actual initiatives. This sets the stage for the following
further research questions: What kind of communication strategy helps generate
nonhypocritical accounts? Which strategy enhances hypocrisy perceptions? Which
strategy improves the legitimacy of companies during and after a scandal?
Third, a communication strategy can also involve the use of different visual elements
within a report. Although this study explores the use of images with negative and positive
valence, further research could explore other characteristics of visual element employment.
For instance, companies can use fictional images or real pictures for aesthetic or informative
reasons and can use specific colors to generate particular emotions in the reader. Thus, future
research can seek to answer the following questions: How can visual elements emphasize
organizational legitimacy? Which images can reduce the hypocrisy perceptions of
stakeholders? Which images can arouse a sense of hypocrisy?
Finally, although this research focuses on the role of companies’ communication strategies,
we recognize the impact that the counter accounts’ point of view can have on other
stakeholders’ perceptions. Indeed, depending on the counter accounts’ reputation and
credibility or theirmotivation to question a company, their claims can provoke different effects.
For instance, if stakeholders do not attribute genuine motivations to the counter accounts’
activity, they can paradoxically play into the hands of the guilty company or diminish its
responsibility. Thus, is the presence of counter accounts consistently negative for companies
experiencing a crisis? Is the image of counter accounts relevant to the hypocrisy inferences
of companies? We encourage further research adopting counter accounts’ perspectives in
new experimental designs and observing how they affect stakeholders’ reactions.
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